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Summary 
In the mid-1990s, a number of different actors were seeking to defuse the increasing 
tensions between the Western and Muslim worlds. The new Iranian president, Mohammed 
Khatami, a moderate reformer, began a process of rapprochement with the West; the 
protagonists of the Oslo peace process were working towards a solution to the key conflict 
between Israel and the Palestinians; and the United Nations, responding to Samuel P. 
Huntington’s warnings of an impending ‘clash of civilizations’, launched an initiative based 
instead on the ‘dialogue of civilizations’. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
took advantage of this situation in order to promote one of its most cherished aims – the 
protection of Islam and Muslims from defamation, blasphemy, and discrimination – as a 
new human-rights norm within the Western-dominated, largely secular UN system. With 
fifty-seven Muslim or Muslim-influenced member-states, the OIC (renamed Organisation 
of Islamic Cooperation in 2011) is the second-largest intergovernmental body after the UN 
and claims to be the voice of the Muslim world. In 1999, Pakistan, acting on behalf of the 
OIC, for the first time brought before the Commission on Human Rights a resolution 
calling for a ban on the ‘defamation of Islam’. After negotiations with Western states, this 
was adopted for the first time – without a vote – under the title ‘Defamation of Religions’. 
The resolution condemns the negative, stereotypical depiction of religions, notably Islam, 
and calls on states to outlaw the ‘defamation of religions’. It was adopted by various UN 
bodies (Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Council, General Assembly) every 
year until 2011. 
This report looks at the OIC’s UN initiative in terms of an attempt to get a new norm 
established internationally using oppositional means. By opting for this strategy, the OIC set 
itself clearly apart from the sort of protests, boycotts, and threats of violence that had 
occurred at the end of the 1980s, in the wake of the publication of the novel The Satanic 
Verses by Indian-born British author Salman Rushdie. Whereas these protests can be seen 
as a form of international dissidence, in the sense of a radical resistance to the Western-
dominated order, the path the OIC chose was one of opposition played out according to the 
rules of international institutions. Normatively, the OIC justified its initiative by reference 
to its role as one of the interpreters of Islamic tradition as it relates to human rights. In 1990, 
it had adopted the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, a document advocating a 
notion of human rights bound to, and limited by, sharia – Islamic law. 
Having initially prospered, the OIC initiative found itself under increasing criticism 
from Western countries in the wake of the terror-attacks of 11 September 2001. Chief 
amongst the criticisms was the claim that the concept of the ‘defamation of religions’ was in 
direct contradiction to the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Human 
rights, it was claimed, afforded protection to individual believers, as repositories of human 
dignity; but shared ideas and beliefs, as exemplified in religions, were not exempted from 
defamation, satirical attack, or vilification. The OIC was also accused of using the UN 
initiative on defamation merely as a way of exporting the sometimes draconian blasphemy-
laws of their member-countries to the international level. The OIC, for its part, argued that 
following the New York attacks, the situation of Muslims – particularly Muslim minorities 
 II 
in Western societies – had suffered a massive decline because the ‘war on terror’ meant that 
they were now virtually under blanket suspicion. It was therefore necessary, they said, to use 
the resolution to provide these minorities with effective protection from discrimination, 
hatred, and defamation. But the OIC’s arguments did not cut any ice: after 2002, support for 
the resolution declined with each passing year. 
Against the background of the gradual demise of the ‘defamation of religions’ resolution 
in the UN, the Danish cartoon crisis of 2005/2006 provided the OIC with a welcome 
opportunity to raise the matter from a different angle. Working in concert with the 
Egyptian government, the OIC played the key part, as an international body, in raising the 
status of the cartoon crisis from that of an internal Danish dispute to that of a worldwide 
political crisis. Although it cannot be accused of having deliberately endorsed the violent 
demonstrations and the arson-attacks on the Danish embassies in Syria and Lebanon, 
nonetheless, with its dogged campaign against the cartoons, the OIC facilitated the shift 
from UN-based attempts at opposition to a new phase of radical dissidence. After this, the 
protest against what was perceived to be the demeaning and defamation of Islam and its 
followers in the name of free speech and freedom of the press was to reignite itself 
repeatedly with further events and publications – from Pope Benedict’s supposedly anti-
Islamic speech in Regensburg to the Charlie Hebdo cartoons. 
In the meantime, attempts were being made at the international level to find a 
cooperative way to resolve the defamation versus free expression conflict. After phases of 
dissidence (Rushdie affair), opposition (OIC’s UN initiative), and renewed dissidence 
(cartoon crisis and subsequent events), the OIC, EU, and USA agreed to the introduction of 
a new, jointly drafted resolution that dropped the idea of the ‘defamation of religions’ and 
operated within the parameters of established human-rights legislation. Adopted by 
consensus for the first time in 2011, the new resolution – Resolution 16/18 – has brought 
with it the hope that some sort of compromise will be possible, at least at the diplomatic 
level, and that this compromise may result in relevant changes in national practice and 
legislation. But the consensus is still very fragile: at the various implementation-meetings 
relating to the resolution (what has become known as the Istanbul Process), the old 
dividing-lines between the OIC member-states and the West have once again opened up. 
Whether it will be possible to make any headway in finding an international solution that 
both satisfies the OIC and is capable of assuaging the international hostility to what is 
perceived as the defamation of Islam is as yet unclear. 
As one of the major players in the Istanbul Process, the European Union should use 
every available opportunity to fight the latest attempts to reintroduce an anti-defamation 
agenda into the debate ‘through the back door’. Attention should in future be directed more 
towards getting the action-plan in Resolution 16/18 implemented and moving beyond the 
polarized theoretical debate. 
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1.  Introduction 
When the authors of the Paris attack of 7 January 2015 opted for the editorial offices of the 
satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo as one of their targets,1 this was not a random choice. 
Though not a high-circulation periodical, the magazine encapsulates, in a way that few 
others do, a culture of free speech in which neither politicians nor religious communities 
nor social institutions in general are spared from biting satire and criticism. And that 
includes Islam. Extremists had already carried out an arson attack on the offices in 2011, 
after the magazine had featured a cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed on its front cover. 
Refusing to be cowed by threatening letters and hate-mail, the editors had continued to put 
out their cartoons and articles, including some critical of Islam. The 7 January attack on the 
magazine’s offices claimed the lives of twelve people, including four of France’s best-known 
political cartoonists. 
In France and far beyond, it was in exactly the symbolic sense suggested above that the 
terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo was construed – in other words, as an attack on freedom 
of expression and freedom of the press, an attack on the basic rights at the heart of Western 
democracies. Previous events such as the ‘Rushdie Affair’ (1988) and the cartoon crisis 
(2005), which had also triggered violent protests and attacks, had been interpreted in the 
same way. At the funeral processions and solidarity rallies that took place following the acts 
of violence in Paris, millions of people demonstrated their determination to defend these 
freedoms by identifying themselves with the magazine, declaring ‘Je suis Charlie’ – ‘I am 
Charlie’. 
But the conflict between, on the one hand, the right to freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press and, on the other, the concern to protect religion – particularly Islam2 
– from denigration, insult, and blasphemy has not played out only at the level of social 
protest and acts of violence. Between 1999 and 2011, the OIC (Organization of the Islamic 
Conference – renamed Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in 2011) attempted to get the 
defamation of religion established as a new norm in the context of the UN human-rights 
 
 
1  Their second target was a Jewish supermarket in Paris. 
2  The conflict affects other religions as well – Christianity, for instance. Recent German examples here 
include a controversial cartoon of Jesus that was hung on the façade of the Caricatura Gallery in Kassel to 
advertise an exhibition and provoked massive criticism from the Christian churches (Spiegel Online, 
August 23, 2012, http://bit.ly/1cRrK4j). Witness also the controversy surrounding the award of the Hesse 
Culture Prize (Hessischer Kulturpreis) to Navid Kermani, who was accused by his fellow laureates 
Cardinal Karl Lehmann and the then Church President of the Protestant Church in Hesse and Nassau, the 
late Peter Steinacker, of defaming the Cross (FAZ, April 14, 2009, http://bit.ly/1BfAAyM). Again, in 2012, 
Pope Benedict XVI took the satirical magazine Titanic to court for its front-cover depiction of him with a 
yellow stain on his white cassock (Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 10, 2012, http://bit.ly/1HQG5w7). None of 
these events, however, triggered the same scale of transnational protest. 
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regime.3 The OIC is the world’s second-largest intergovernmental organization after the 
United Nations, currently comprising fifty-seven self-declared Muslim countries. In 1999, 
Pakistan, acting on behalf of the OIC, for the first time brought before the Commission on 
Human Rights a resolution calling for a ban on the ‘defamation of Islam’. After negotiations 
with Western states, this was adopted for the first time under the title ‘Defamation of 
Religions’. Variations of this resolution, with only minor modifications, were then 
introduced, and duly adopted, on an annual basis, initially in the Commission on Human 
Rights and later in the latter’s successor, the Human Rights Council, and the UN General 
Assembly. Only in 2011 did the OIC give in to growing pressure from Western states and 
agree to an alternative draft resolution in which the notion of the ‘defamation of religions’ 
no longer figured. 
What lies at the heart of both the OIC’s UN initiative and the demonstrations, protests, 
and violent unrest is the clash between the right to freedom of expression and the demand 
that Islam be protected from denigration and blasphemy and that free speech be curtailed to 
achieve this. In this report, both forms of contestation will be interpreted as expressions of 
resistance by Muslim actors to the dominant Western secular world order and its 
underlying norms. In adopting this analytical perspective, the report pursues a line of 
argument put forward in a number of recent theoretical accounts in International Relations 
which assume that structures of rule exist at the international level as well, in the form of ‘a 
structure of institutionalized superordination and subordination’ which ‘determines how 
life’s goods and the potential to influence are distributed and stabilizes expectations in 
regard to compliance’ (Daase/Deitelhoff 2014: 1). A necessary concomitant of political rule, 
irrespective of whether the latter has legitimate foundations and inspires voluntary 
allegiance or is imposed through coercion and oppression, is resistance – to particular 
policies, to structures and institutions, or to the order as a whole (Daase/Deitelhoff 2014: 
11). Daase and Deitelhoff distinguish between two forms of resistance: opposition, which 
accepts the rules of the game imposed by the global system of rule; and dissidence, which 
operates outside these rules. 
In promoting its initiative, the OIC has opted for the oppositional form of resistance. Its 
aim is to effect a change in the catalogue of human rights from within the UN system and it 
thus operates according to the rules of the established international institutions of global 
politics. By contrast, the protests, boycotts, and violent unrest in this area should be seen as 
expressions of dissidence, asserting itself outside the prevailing rules and institutions. The 
present report explores both forms of resistance but focuses particularly on the oppositional 
activities of the OIC, which have so far received little attention in the literature. What were 
 
 
3  The international human-rights regime that has evolved within the framework of the UN is based 
essentially on three documents: the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966). In terms of institutions, the bodies chiefly responsible for implementing human-
rights rules and norms are the UN Human Rights Council and the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. See Donnelly 2013: 162. 
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the preconditions and motives for the OIC’s anti-defamation campaign? What is the 
conflict essentially about? Why did the OIC campaign fail? And is there any interplay 
between the OIC opposition and the protests and violent behaviour engaged in by the 
dissident actors? 
Dissident and Oppositional Forms of Resistance to the Western Secular Order 
As mentioned at the outset, the attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo was merely the latest 
in a series of clashes in which Muslim actors gave expression – on this occasion with lethal 
violence – to their disapproval and outrage at what they perceived to be the lack of respect 
shown by Western societies towards Islam. It should be noted that those who react to 
Western depictions of Islam4 in this way are radicalized minorities. This is demonstrated, 
for example, in a study recently conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation, which showed, 
in the case of Germany, that whilst Islamophobia is on the increase in German majority 
society, most Muslims actually place a high value on democracy and are open to the idea of 
religious diversity (Religionsmonitor 2015). Even in Muslim majority societies such as 
Tunisia, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Egypt, the picture is a much more diverse one than many 
media-reports suggest. Surveys indicate that there is a very high level of support for 
democracy and personal freedoms – and at the same time a desire that Islam should to 
some extent inform politics (Pew Research Center 2012). 
The first clash between differing normative outlooks on freedom of expression came in 
the guise of the ‘Rushdie affair’. 1988 saw the publication, by the Indian-born British writer 
Salman Rushdie, of his novel The Satanic Verses, in which, ‘in a piece of ribald satire, [he] 
presents an allegorical dream-sequence involving the Prophet Mohammed’ and recounts 
how ‘twelve whores in a house of pleasure assume the names of the Prophet’s wives in order 
to buck up custom’.5 The book immediately prompted a wave of angry protest amongst 
Muslims all over the world, and many countries banned it. The strongest reaction, however, 
came from Iran: the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa – an Islamic 
legal ruling – condemning Rushdie to death and calling on all Muslims to carry out the 
execution.6 For Rushdie there followed years of fear and isolation: he was forced to hide 
away and regularly change his place of residence; his publishers received bomb threats; and 
the Japanese translator of The Satanic Verses was murdered. Relations between Iran and the 
West sank to an all-time low. 
 
 
4  Countries such as Egypt and Iran also have political cartoonists. See Karim El-Gawahry, Wenn Bärtige 
zeichnen schwierig ist, in: taz online, January 24, 2015, www.taz.de/!5023189/ (January 25, 2015); see also 
Iranische Karikaturisten machen sich über IS lustig, in: Zeit Online, May 31, 2015, http://bit.ly/1KSfzTA, 
(July 2, 2015). 
5  Almut Cieschinger (2009): Der Dichter und sein Henker. 20 Jahre Rushdie-Affäre, in: Spiegel Online, 
http://bit.ly/1GjYHDd, (January 16, 2015). 
6  Other Islamic scholars – such as those from the Al-Azhar University in Egypt – objected to the fatwa. 
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In the mid-2000s, following the attacks of 11 September 2001, tensions once again arose 
between the Muslim and Western worlds, sparked by the issue of free speech. In 2005, the 
Danish daily newspaper Jyllands-Posten published a series of cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammed, provoking a major diplomatic crisis and a series of violent disturbances and 
protests. In many Muslim-influenced countries, pictorial depiction of the Prophet is 
regarded as taboo. In 2006 in Regensburg, Germany, Pope Benedict XVI delivered a 
controversial lecture in which he cited a remark made by a Byzantine emperor to the effect 
that Mohammed had ‘brought nothing but evil’ because he preached that faith should be 
spread by the sword.7 In 2008, the film Fitna, made by the right-wing populist politician 
Geert Wilders, caused outrage. In 2012, trailers for an amateur anti-Muslim film called 
Innocence of Muslims, made in the USA, appeared on YouTube. Furious protests erupted in 
the Muslim world and bomb attacks were carried out on US embassies and consulates in the 
Middle East, resulting in over thirty dead. 
It was in the period between the Rushdie affair and the events of the mid-2000s that the 
OIC launched its initiative to establish a new UN-based norm requiring states to outlaw the 
‘defamation of religions’. To begin with, the initiative seemed to be a success for the OIC: in 
both 1999 and 2000, the Commission on Human Rights adopted the anti-defamation 
resolution without a vote. However, in the wake of the New York attacks, the concept of the 
defamation of religions came under increasing criticism, both from non-governmental 
organizations and from Western states, most notably the USA. From year to year, support 
for the resolution declined. In 2011, it was finally removed from the agenda and replaced 
with one entitled ‘Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and 
Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against, Persons based on Religion or 
Belief’,8 which moved away from the concept of the defamation of religions. In 2005, in the 
same period during which the OIC was pursuing its internationally largely unremarked UN 
initiative, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published a collection of cartoons of the 
Prophet Mohammed and this marked a turning-point: the dissidence now entered a new 
phase of radical resistance in which the denigration of Islam in the name of free speech was 
met with protests and violence. 
This report begins by describing the special status of the OIC in international relations as 
an organization which, since the 1990s, has increasingly intervened in the global human-
rights debate as an exponent of Islamic tradition. Although from 2005 onwards there were 
signs that the OIC was aligning itself more closely to internationally codified human rights, 
the protection of the Muslim faithful from defamation, insult, and blasphemy and the 
struggle against Islamophobia remain amongst its key aims – even where they involve 
curtailment of press freedom and freedom of expression9 In the sections that follow, I shall 
 
 
7  For a verbatim version of the lecture, see http://bit.ly/1GHhqXS (March 7, 2015). 
8  United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Resolution 16/18, April 12, 2011, 
http://bit.ly/1Si1zVc (October 14, 2015) 
9  OIC Charter, Art. 1/12, http://bit.ly/1HLe8RY (January 16, 2015).  
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analyse the motives and conditions underlying the OIC campaign. In terms of motives: 
besides the concern to improve the situation of Muslim minorities beyond the borders of 
the Muslim world, the prime factor at work here is the often harsh blasphemy-legislation in 
force in many of the organization’s member-states, which serves the governments in 
question as a repressive instrument for maintaining power. A new norm prohibiting 
defamation would lend these laws international legitimacy. From this point of view, the 
initiative in the UN serves to consolidate authoritarian regimes in the member-states. But it 
was the historical context in the 1990s – which brought with it an at least partial opening-up 
of the UN to dialogue and compromise with the Muslim world – that first enabled the OIC 
to express its objections to particular Western secular norms from within the system, using 
the tools of opposition. This tends to confirm the hypothesis that where there is increased 
opportunity for involvement and increased space for objection, there will be a de-
radicalization of dissidence into opposition (Daase/Deitelhoff 2014: 13). 
This process, however, is not irreversible. After only a few years, following some initial 
successes in the relevant UN forums, the OIC initiative began to lose support amongst other 
UN members. The increasing rejection of the initiative by other states reduced the scope for 
involvement. Although the OIC did not itself subsequently become a dissident actor, it 
played a decisive stimulatory role in the escalation of events during the 2005 cartoon crisis. 
Against this background, the present report reconstructs the course of the OIC’s UN 
campaign between 1999 and 2011, examines its political, historical, and human-rights 
context, and explores the interplay between the campaign and the international protests and 
violent unrest that occurred in the wake of what were perceived to be blasphemous 
depictions of Islam in Western societies. 
2.  The OIC and International Human Rights 
Whether modern human rights, as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and subsequent UN conventions, have universal validity is a matter of dispute. For differing 
cultural, intellectual, and religious reasons, critics argue that human rights are a product of 
Western culture and tradition and therefore cannot simply be transposed onto societies of 
different cultural or religious stamp. Thus, in the ‘Asian values’ debate of the 1990s, Asian 
countries claimed to have a culturally determined value-system of their own, in which 
collective rights were accorded preference over the individualism of human rights. In Islam 
too there are many who advocate a particularist interpretation of human rights, one derived 
from Islamic tradition and differing in a number of points from the international human 
rights of the UN system. One of the most important human-rights declarations to have 
emanated from the Muslim world is the ‘Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam’, 
adopted by the OIC in 1990. In the sections that follow here, I describe the OIC, discuss its 
position in the human-rights debate, and, in conclusion, examine the blasphemy-laws in 
certain OIC member-states, which have exerted considerable influence on the OIC’s anti-
defamation campaign inside the UN. 
6 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse 
 
 
2.1 The Voice of the Ummah? The OIC between Religion and Politics 
As an international organization, the OIC is an anomaly. With fifty-seven member-states, it 
is the second-largest intergovernmental body after the UN.10 At the same time, in contrast to 
regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), it does not represent a geographically definable area, its 
membership being distributed across four continents. Many OIC states, for example, are 
also members of the Arab League, a classic regional organization, but a good many are not. 
Again, the OIC is not held together by some functional interest, as is, say, a free trade zone. 
What is distinctive about the OIC, rather, is that it is defined by the Islamic orientation of its 
member-states – though this ranges in degree from constitutional embodiment of Islam as 
the state religion to the presence of a substantial Muslim minority and encompasses all the 
widely differing trends within Islam. Although in many respects the OIC functions in the 
same way that secular intergovernmental organizations do within international relations, its 
religious aspect sets it apart from other bodies: ‘[T]he idiosyncrasy of the OIC is categorical, 
for whilst adhering to the secular logic of multistate functionalism, its ideological source is 
reflected solely in terms of a religious attribute, that of Islam, and its purpose is guided by a 
single imperative, that of pan-Islamism’ (Sheikh 2003: 16). Decisions are made by two-
thirds majority of the assembly of member-states, regardless of whether the states that vote 
are Islamic by constitution or, like Turkey and Lebanon, explicitly secular. The 1972 OIC 
Charter stipulates absolute respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial 
integrity of member-states, bringing the OIC into line with the standards of the UN, from 
which it seeks recognition as a legitimate association of states. 
The OIC came into being in the 1960s, at a time when allegiances in the Middle East 
were defined, as elsewhere, by the Cold War. From the 1950s, the pro-US Saudi royal house 
suffered a marked decline in power by comparison with the pro-Soviet revolutionary 
regimes such as those in Egypt and Syria. Towards the end of the 1960s, however, two 
events occurred which turned the tide. The defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 June War 
against Israel was perceived as a gross humiliation and resulted in a weakening of the 
secular pan-Arabism of the pro-Soviet regimes. Then in August 1969, an Australian tourist 
carried out an arson attack on the Al-Aqsa mosque in the old quarter of Jerusalem, but 
neighbouring Arab countries suspected that Israel itself had masterminded this assault on 
one of Islam’s most important holy places.11 Both events seemed to testify to the inability of 
secular ideologies to defend the interests of Muslims and to the need to return to a pan-
Islamic vision (Sheikh 2003: 36). Within the societies concerned, conservative inter-
pretations of Islam began to gain in importance during this period, one of their most 
prominent exponents being Sayyid Qutb, the guiding light behind the Muslim Brotherhood 
 
 
10  www.oic-oci.org (October 14, 2015). 
11  See Haug von Kuenheim (1969), Die Brandfackel von El-Aqsa, in: Die Zeit, August 29, 1969, 
http://bit.ly/1yRAJHE (October 14, 2015). 
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in Egypt. On the international stage, it was primarily Saudi Arabia that pushed through the 
creation of the OIC, as a way of diminishing the influence of the secular pan-Arabists in the 
region. 
The first Islamic summit – convened by Saudi Arabia, the Shah’s Iran, Morocco, and 
Pakistan – was held in Rabat as early as September 1969. Twenty-four countries plus the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) took part in the meeting, which saw the 
foundation of what was then known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The 
founding members cherished widely differing national ambitions; the only thing that kept 
the OIC together in its founding period was its members’ shared hostility to Israel. As a 
result, the issue of the holy places of Islam in Jerusalem – and thus also of the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict – remained core themes of the OIC for decades. 
Beyond this, however, the OIC hardly ever managed to speak with one voice. On the 
contrary, it was marked by a host of internal tensions and conflicts, reflecting the culturally, 
politically, and socially highly diverse nature of the countries that composed it. The early 
period was itself marked by internal rifts between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan over the 
leadership of the OIC. Later on, member-states repeatedly found themselves on opposing 
sides in international events, crises, and (sometimes violent) conflicts. Examples here 
include the peace between Egypt and Israel, the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, and the war in Afghanistan (Petersen 2012: 12; Wastnidge 2011). Again, 
the very different approaches of individual member-states to Islamist and Jihadist groups 
continue, even today, to be a source of tension. Whilst the OIC officially promotes a 
tolerant, moderate form of Islam and has vowed to combat terrorism, individual member-
countries such as Sudan and Iran are suspected of lending support to terrorist groups 
(Haynes 2012: 54–55). 
This lack of unity between member-states means that the OIC has not succeeded in 
achieving its goal – that of improving the status of Muslims worldwide – to the extent 
suggested by its own claims. As a result, its influence in international relations falls short of 
what one would expect from the second-largest intergovernmental organization in the 
world – a state of affairs reflected in the paucity of scholarly literature on the OIC (Haynes 
2012: 53). 
This still low level of visibility in international politics should not, however, blind us to 
the fact that since 2005 the OIC has been undergoing a remarkable transformation. In that 
year, the foreign ministers of the member-states elected the OIC’s first General Secretary – 
the Turkish science historian Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu. A ten-year action-plan was drafted, as 
a result of which sustainable development in the member-states, emergency aid, closer 
cooperation with other international organizations, and the fight against violent, extremist 
ideologies made their way onto the OIC’s agenda.12 The OIC’s charter was also overhauled:13 
 
 
12  http://bit.ly/1FxcS4E (October 14, 2015). 
13  For the new version, see http://bit.ly/1FhQRV1 (October 14, 2015). 
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it now made reference, for the first time, to human rights, to democracy and the rule of law, 
to equality before the law, and to women’s rights (Hermann 2013) – though always in the 
context of Islamic values and without calling the sovereignty of member-states into 
question. It was also during Ihsanoğlu’s tenure that the OIC’s name was changed from 
‘Organization of the Islamic Conference’ to ‘Organisation for Islamic Cooperation’ – a 
programmatic title signalling the upgrading of the organization from conference to distinct 
entity. Since this time, the OIC has increased its humanitarian help for people in regions of 
crisis and conflict such as Bangladesh and Somalia. Also remarkable have been its efforts to 
mediate between warring parties in conflicts such as those in Palestine, Afghanistan, and 
Niger (Hermann 2013). How the OIC will develop from here, under its new General 
Secretary Iyad Madani, the former Saudi Minister of Culture and Information, remains to 
be seen. Madani is reported to be a good deal more conservative than his predecessor 
Ihsanoğlu. 
2.2  The OIC and Islamic Human Rights 
Whether and to what extent a particular religion, or religion per se, is compatible with 
modern human rights as codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
follow-up documents has been extensively discussed in the literature.14 The present report, 
by contrast, will leave this issue to one side and instead follow the line adopted by Cismas 
(2014) in her book Religious Actors and International Law. Cismas makes the criticism that 
studies which pose the basic question of the compatibility of religion and human rights tend 
overwhelmingly to portray religions as static, monolithic entities. The scriptures of many 
religions have indeed remained unchanged over centuries, she says, but the interpretations 
and practices of religious communities are ‘dynamic over time and diverse across space’ 
(Cismas 2014: 2). As a result, religions encompass a broad spectrum of complementary, and 
sometimes contradictory, views on specific topics and issues: ‘It is here where the role of 
religious actors as interpreters of religion(s) becomes central, because through 
interpretation they generate the dynamism and diversity of religions’ (Cismas 2014: 3). 
Cismas construes religious actors such as the Holy See or the OIC as interpreters of 
religious tradition who also claim validity for their interpretations. Rather than simply 
extending the debate over the basic compatibility of religion, law, and politics, this approach 
allows one to analyse real actors and their interpretations of religious traditions as they 
relate to politics and law. 
The OIC has been playing the role of interpreter of Islamic tradition as it relates to 
human rights since at least the time of the adoption of the Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam in 199015 – despite the fact that such a function is not really provided for in 
 
 
14  See Bucar/Barnett 2005; van der Vyver, Johan D./Witte Jr., John 1996; Runzo et al. 2003; Lerner 2006. 
15  Text available at www.oic-oci.org/english/article/human.htm (March 25, 2015). 
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its charter (Mayer 2015: 13).16 The phenomenon of Muslim writers taking it upon 
themselves to justify human rights from an Islamic perspective is a recent one and can be 
seen as a reaction to the formulation of political and civil rights in Western societies. The 
various trends within Islam, taken in all their diversity, certainly have the philosophical 
concepts, humanistic values, and moral principles needed to construct a set of human-
rights principles. However, the historically determined predominance of conservative 
strains of philosophy and theology in Muslim-influenced countries has pushed these 
potential sources into the background (Mayer 2013: 44). 
In the discourse between Muslim and Western conceptions of human rights, there is, as 
in the ‘Asian values’ debate’, disagreement as to whether such rights should be defined 
collectively or individually. As currently recognized at the international level, human rights 
are founded on the kind of individualism that has been a feature of Western societies since 
the dawn of the modern age.17 Of course, this does not mean that such rights do not have an 
inherent social, communitarian dimension. The right to religious freedom, for example, 
always also encompasses the right to shared worship and the right to establish religious 
communities. Again, one of the goals of freedom of expression is, not least, to make it 
possible for citizens to engage in public discourse (Bielefeldt 1995: 591–592). Nonetheless, 
the assumption is that respect for human rights is something that applies to the individual 
and not to a collectivity – whatever its nature. In many Muslim societies, by contrast, 
traditional, communally oriented notions of rights held sway for many years (Donnelly 
2013: 79–81).18 This fundamental tension continues, even today, to be detectable in the 
various blueprints for Islamic human rights:19 ‘[P]roponents of Islamic human rights 
schemes have tended to associate the defense of Islamic values with the rejection of 
individualism, and they have espoused principles – such as a ban on converting from Islam 
– that are designed to protect the collective at the expense of the individual’ (Mayer 2013: 
44). The upshot has been a series of documents which, whilst cleaving to the prevailing 
 
 
16 The claim to be offering an exposition of Islamic tradition that is applicable to present-day problems is, of 
course, one that is advanced by many other actors – the Leader of the Revolution in Iran, for example, or 
the Al-Azar University in Egypt. On the other hand, there is no central authority of the kind that exists in 
Catholicism. 
17  Donnelly points out that in view of phenomena such estate-based society, wars of religion, and, at a later 
stage, imperialism and slavery, Western culture could not be said to have been particularly predestined to 
give birth to human rights: ‘What we think of today as Western culture is largely a result, not a cause, of 
human rights ideas and practices’ (Donnelly 2013: 107). 
18  Islam is not the only religion in a relationship of tension with modern human rights. It was not until the 
Second Vatican Council of 1962–65 that the Catholic Church finally made its peace with human rights, 
and particularly with religious freedom. See Heimbach-Steins 2012. 
19  Examples are: the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, 
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/islamic_declaration_HR.html (March 17, 2015), which was published 
in 1981 by the Islamic Council of Europe, a private organization based in London; and the legal 
provisions contained in the 1979 Draft Islamic Constitution for Egypt drawn up by the Islamic Research 
Academy in Cairo and in the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. See Mayer 2013. 
10 Claudia Baumgart-Ochse 
 
 
orthodox-conservative interpretation of Islamic traditions, embraces and imitates the 
language of international human rights. 
This is true of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, a non-binding OIC 
instrument adopted by the foreign ministers of the OIC member-countries in 1990. There is 
no challenge to Islamic law or sharia – deriving mainly from the Qur’an and the Sunna20 – 
in the Cairo Declaration. On the contrary, the document cites it as the yardstick that 
determines the extent and substance of Islamic human rights (Bielefeldt 1995: 605). The last 
two articles (24 and 25) explicitly state that all the rights and freedoms contained in the 
Declaration are subject to sharia and that only sharia can serve as the basis for inter-
pretation and exposition. At the same time, the Declaration forgoes any attempt to indicate 
exactly what is meant by ‘sharia’ and how the latter should be interpreted. This is a matter 
on which Islam’s various schools of legal and theological thought disagree. 
The Declaration’s tie-in to sharia means that although many of its provisions seem at 
first sight virtually identical to those in the relevant UN human-rights agreements, they turn 
out to be limited by various restrictive clauses. By way of example: Article 2 prohibits the 
killing of other human beings – except for reasons prescribed by sharia; Article 7 allows 
parents a free choice in selecting the education they want for their children – provided this 
accords with the principles of sharia; and Article 22 guarantees freedom of expression – 
insofar as this does not violate the provisions of sharia, and safeguards freedom of 
information – provided this causes no detriment to the sanctity and dignity of the Prophet 
(Cismas 2014: 254–265; Mayer 2013: 80–81). A number of provisions present, for example, 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other UN documents, are simply absent 
from the Cairo Declaration.21 Others fall markedly short of international human-rights 
standards. This is particularly true of the articles dealing with equality of the sexes and the 
protection of the family (Articles 5, 6, and 7). Also problematic from the point of view of 
UN human rights is Article 10, which prohibits any attempt to persuade a person to turn 
away from Islam (apostasy) and convert to other religions or to atheism. This directly 
contradicts the right to freedom of religion. By according absolute priority to sharia, the 
Cairo Declaration weakens or negates some of the fundamental provisions of international 
human-rights law (Bielefeldt 1995: 606). Although the Declaration itself does not sanction 
any human-rights violations, it opens the door to particular interpretations of sharia that 
allow for measures such as corporal punishment or the unequal treatment of women 
(Cismas 2014: 265). 
Although to begin with the Cairo Declaration was enthusiastically promoted by the OIC, 
there were very few follow-up initiatives aimed at getting the catalogue of Islamic human 
rights implemented in member-states. This is largely explained by the fact that member-
states are by no means agreed as to how sharia should be interpreted for the present age. In 
 
 
20  Ways of the Prophet. 
21  The right of free assembly, for example, or freedom of religion. 
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fact, the objections which the OIC countries have expressed in regard to human-rights 
conventions in the UN context reveal a wide spectrum of opinions here: ‘[S]haria law 
limitation clauses in the Cairo Declaration are not representative of the views and 
approaches of all OIC member states’ (Cismas 2014: 274). Whereas some states indicate a 
willingness gradually to move closer to the international understanding of human rights, 
and regard a new interpretation of sharia as possible and necessary, others stick to a 
conservative exposition of sharia that reflects their own systems of justice. Equally, the 
regular reports in which the OIC states give details of the measures they have taken to 
implement UN human-rights agreements very rarely mention the Cairo Declaration as a 
benchmark. As a result, the influence which the Declaration has had on member-states has 
been minimal (Cismas 2014: 279). 
It was only with the advent of the OIC’s 2005 self-prescribed ‘Ten Year Program of 
Action’ that the approach to human rights, along with much else, was revised. One product 
of the processes of reform set in train by the action-plan was the creation, in 2011, of the 
Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission. It was hoped that the establishment 
of the Commission would see the OIC align itself more closely to international human-
rights standards. Although the Preamble to the Commission’s Statutes22 still makes 
generalized reference to the Cairo Declaration, the rest of the text promises a new approach: 
‘[T]here can be no doubt that the Commission relies on a conception of human rights that 
is closer to the UN Declaration on Human Rights than the Cairo Declaration, based as it is 
on an understanding of civil, political, cultural and economic right as outlined “in 
universally agreed human rights instruments”’ (Petersen 2012: 29). The former General 
Secretary of the OIC Ihsanoğlu had already stated, in a 2009 interview, that the Cairo 
Declaration needed to be revised ‘in keeping with the current global human rights 
discourse’ (quoted in Petersen 2012: 29). According to its Statutes, the new Commission is 
to be geared not so much to establishing an alternative system of human rights but more 
towards achieving integration into the existing system of human-rights legislation in the 
UN (Petersen 2012: 30). Its job, as a consultative body, is to support OIC member-states in 
fulfilling their human-rights obligations. The Commission is made up of eighteen 
independent human-rights experts from various member-countries. It does not itself have 
the power to issue binding directives, but it does have the right to make recommendations 
to the OIC Council of Foreign Ministers, who, where applicable, convert these into 
resolutions. In addition, it is charged with: overseeing cooperation between member-states 
on matters relating to human rights; facilitating the involvement of civil society; and 
strengthening cooperation with international institutions. By contrast, it is not mandated to 
investigate human-rights violations in OIC member-countries (Petersen 2012: 21). 
To date, the Commission has held seven regular sessions. Initial analyses of its work 
from the point of view of the UN catalogue of human rights are not reassuring. The hope, 
 
 
22  Statute of the OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission, OIC/IPCHR/2010/STATUTE, 
http://bit.ly/1IncUjo (May 21, 2015). 
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cherished early on, that the establishment of the Commission would result in the OIC’s 
aligning itself more closely to international human-rights standards is, it seems, not being 
fulfilled. Doubts in this regard are being fuelled, not least, by the changes in personnel at the 
top of the OIC and the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission: in 2013, 
Ihsanoğlu was replaced by Iyad Madani as the OIC’s General Secretary; and the Nigerian 
diplomat Kawu Ibrahim took the place of the Indonesian scientist and women’s rights 
campaigner Siti Ruhaini Duhayatin at the head of the Commission. Whereas Ihsanoğlu and 
Duhayatin stood for an opening-up of the OIC to international human rights, the two new 
chiefs downplay the universality of human rights in favour of Islamic teachings (Kayaoglu 
2015). At the opening of a 2014 session of the Commission, for example, Madani criticized 
the right to free expression and emphasized the determination of Muslim countries to 
ensure respect for the sanctity and integrity of religious values, scriptures, and personages 
(Kayaoglu 2015: 14). 
Also of note is the Commission’s almost exclusive focus on issues in which non-
member-states are viewed as instigators of human-rights violations: the human-rights 
situation in the Israeli-occupied territories; the fight against Islamophobia in Western states; 
the effects of sanctions (especially US sanctions) on human rights in affected member-
states; the human-rights violations perpetrated on the Muslim Rohingya minority in 
Myanmar as victims of discrimination (Kayaoglu 2015: 16). Meanwhile, the often none too 
impressive human-rights records of the OIC’s own member-states have so far elicited only 
peripheral interest from the Commission. In addition, many of the Commission’s official 
documents lack any reference to the basic UN human-rights conventions. Kayaoglu fears 
that this latest phase in the development of the Commission may bring with it a return to 
the OIC’s anti-defamation campaign in the UN: ‘The IPHRC’s prioritization of combating 
Islamophobia also harkens back to the OIC’s anti-defamation of religions efforts. Revisiting 
this campaign will be unhelpful and will also raise skepticism about the OIC’s commitment 
to Resolution 16/18’ (Kayaoglu 2015: 16). 
2.3  Freedom of Religion and the Laws on Blasphemy in OIC Member-Countries 
The OIC’s UN-based campaign against the ‘defamation of religions’ does not spring solely 
from OIC ideas and initiatives; it is also rooted in the national legislations of many of its 
member-states, under which blasphemy and apostasy – the renunciation of faith – is 
prohibited and in some cases subject to draconian penalties. Because of this, the specialist 
legal literature on the resolutions relating to defamation of religions often alleges that 
influential OIC member-states are merely using the organization to get their own 
blasphemy-laws internationally legitimized via the relevant UN bodies (Marshall 2011; 
Rehman/Berry 2012; Dobras 2008; Belnap 2011). They are thus choosing the path of 
opposition in the UN as a way of bolstering their power at home. 
Laws that treat blasphemy as a punishable offence are by no means the preserve of the 
Muslim world. Traditionally, it has been mainly Christian countries that have legislated 
either to ban blasphemy altogether or to protect the particular religious community or 
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church that was dominant at the time. It is only recently that states such as Britain, Ireland, 
Greece, and Sweden have done away with their blasphemy-laws or begun largely to ignore 
them (Temperman 2008: 519–521; Siddique/Hayat 2008: 354–357). The German penal code 
makes blasphemy a punishable offence in cases where it occasions a breach of the peace. 
Convictions, however, are few and far between. By contrast, in India, Russia, and Sri Lanka, 
blasphemy-laws continue to be used as a means of preserving the religious monopoly of the 
dominant group (Graham 2009: 81). 
In many OIC member-states too blasphemy-laws remain in force and are duly applied: 
countries such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Egypt, and Bangladesh have legal provisions – some of them of constitutional status – 
which either accord protection against defamation and blasphemy exclusively to Islam or 
else accord it de jure to all the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) whilst de 
facto applying it for the most part only to Islam. Temperman concludes ‘that “the protection 
of religion” in some states – most visibly so in states that identify strongly with a single 
religion – functions as a ground for limiting fundamental rights, particularly the right to 
freedom of expression’ (Temperman 2008: 525). The prohibition of blasphemy has a long 
tradition in Muslim countries – just as it does in the European countries previously 
mentioned. The traditional schools of jurisprudence within Islam consider both blasphemy 
and apostasy to be grave breaches of the law. In their study on the correlation between the 
degree to which freedom of religion is either granted or denied by the state and the level of 
violent persecution of religious groups across the world, Grim and Finke (2011) identify 
apostasy and blasphemy as the areas in which Islamic law typically clashes with the UN 
conventions on religious freedom. This is because in the case of blasphemy the spotlight 
often falls on other religious minorities, who are accused of blaspheming against or 
insulting the dominant religion simply by virtue of practising their own religion. The fact 
that blasphemy-laws remain in force, and are regularly applied, in many Muslim countries, 
whereas in Europe they now have very little significance, is put down primarily to political 
motives. In general, governments across the world mostly place restrictions on the free 
exercise of religion when they see their own power or the prevailing social order under 
threat: ‘The state, of course, restricts the freedoms of religions perceived to be a threat to the 
social order or the ruling regime’ (Grim/Finke 2011: 6). Accusations of blasphemy or 
denigration of religion are generally directed against minorities that are perceived to be a 
threat to the ruling elite and the dominant religion and culture. As a result, blasphemy-laws 
become repressive instruments in the hands of authoritarian regimes (Belnap 2011: 13). 
This is illustrated particularly clearly by the case of Pakistan, which has one of the most 
stringent blasphemy-laws in the world. It is also the country that first introduced the 
resolution on the ‘defamation of religions’ into the UN Commission on Human Rights on 
behalf of the OIC in 1999 and is its chief apologist. Like the resolutions on the defamation of 
religions, Pakistan’s blasphemy-laws are designed to protect not individual believers but 
religion per se – and in fact only Islam. It is not necessary to be able to prove discriminatory 
intent on the part of the alleged perpetrators and so, in Pakistan, the simple fact of religious 
minorities professing their own faith can be construed as an insult to, and a defamation of, 
Islam (Dobras 2008: 355–356). This is in direct contravention of the right to freedom of 
religion. 
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Blasphemy-legislation was first introduced into pre-partition India in 1927 by the British 
colonial authorities as a way of keeping religious tensions – chiefly between Hindus and 
Muslims – under control. After the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, the newly created 
state of Pakistan took over the legislation and incorporated it into its own legal system. 
However, during the military dictatorship of Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988), who 
sought to Islamize Pakistan and establish a theocracy (Siddique/Hayat 2008: 316), the 
legislation was narrowed to cover only the defamation of Islam and was massively tightened 
up. One of the paragraphs inserted into the law, for example, stipulates the death penalty for 
defamation of the Prophet Mohammed. In addition, since the time of the revision, those 
who have found themselves most often in the sights of the justice-system are the members 
of the Ahmadiyya community.23 In Pakistan, Ahmadis are not considered to be Muslim and 
by describing themselves as such, or making reference to Islamic beliefs, they render 
themselves guilty of blasphemy (Rehman/Berry 2012: 460). 
Between 1987 and 2012, 426 people were arrested for blasphemy. This figure only 
includes officially documented cases: according to press reports, the actual number is much 
higher. The majority of those accused are members of minorities (Nafees 2012: 51–52). 
Legal proceedings are often delayed, not least because judges and advocates are themselves 
afraid to become victims of persecution if they find in favour of the accused. Up to now, no 
sentence of death for blasphemy has ever been carried out. However, since 1990, more than 
fifty people have been murdered as a result of accusations of blasphemy. In November 2014 
in Punjab, for example, an angry mob threw a Christian couple into the furnace of the 
brick-factory where they both worked because, so it was claimed, they had desecrated a 
copy of the Qur’an.24 Again, in 2011, two high-ranking Pakistani politicians were murdered 
after speaking up for Asia Noreen, who was alleged to have insulted the Prophet and in 2009 
had become the first Christian woman to be condemned to death in Pakistan, remaining to 
this day in prison. When charges of blasphemy are made, this often also leads to displays of 
violence against non-Muslim religious minorities in Pakistan – and sometimes also against 
Muslim minorities such as Shiites and Sufis. Although the country has ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and is therefore obligated to take 
action against this kind of incitement to religious hatred and to violence against minorities, 
perpetrators are often not prosecuted. This climate of impunity encourages religious 
extremists to make deliberate use of blasphemy charges in order to act against particular 
minorities. 
One of the ways in which the Pakistani government justifies maintaining its blasphemy-
laws is to point to its constitutionally enshrined right to restrict freedom of expression in 
cases where public order, decency, or morality are under threat in the Islamic state (Dobras 
 
 
23  The Ahmadiyya movement is a trend that emerged within Islam in the late 19th cent. It traces its roots 
back to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, self-styled ‘mahdi’ or ‘messiah’ (Schimmel 2010: 127). 
24  www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/pakistan-christen-nach-blasphemie-vorwurf-lebendig-verbrannt-a-
1001040.html (September 29, 2015). 
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2008: 359). Zia-ul-Haq’s instrumentalization of Islam as a way of legitimizing and bolstering 
power is a practice still in use in present-day Pakistan: ‘The legacy of using Islam for 
political purposes has persisted into independent Pakistan. [R]eligion – the “leitmotif of an 
otherwise variegated culture” – has continued to be used as an instrument for engendering 
unity, garnering support for unpopular regimes, and preventing backlashes that invariably 
arise against any regime that appears unacceptably un-Islamic’ (Siddique/Hayat 2008: 318). 
In their detailed specialist assessment of blasphemy-legislation in Pakistan, Siddique and 
Hayat come to the conclusion that this legislation serves the autocratic interests of the 
regime, fuels the climate of intolerance and hatred, affords protection to religious zealots 
and fanatics, and is used as a means of settling personal scores (Siddique/Hayat 2008: 384). 
3.  The OIC and the ‘Defamation of Religions’ 
The OIC’s attempt to establish the ‘defamation of religions’ as a new norm in the UN 
human-rights framework cannot be explained without reference to the historical and legal 
context. This UN-based initiative occurred at a time when various actors from the Western 
and Muslim sides were attempting to calm the increasingly tense situation through dialogue 
and cooperation. The UN itself was offering the Muslim states more opportunities to 
become involved and help shape outcomes, thus making it possible for the OIC to follow an 
oppositional course. Thus, during this phase, the OIC chose the path of resistance from 
within UN institutions as its preferred means of dealing with what it regarded as the 
rampant problem of Islamophobia and lack of respect for Islam in Western societies. 
Within these institutions, however, the resolution it proposed came up against an 
established structure of human rights with which the new concept of the ‘defamation of 
religions’ was clearly at odds. In what follows here, I shall begin by reviewing the historical 
context. After that, I shall describe the existing UN regulations on freedom of speech and 
freedom of religion and the new norm aimed at outlawing the ‘defamation of religions’. 
3.1  The Historical Context of the OIC’s UN Initiative 
The Western perception of particular political and ideological readings of Islamic tradition 
as problematic and dangerous did not begin with the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in 
Syria and Iraq – though IS’s geographical spread, brutality, degree of organization, and 
power to attract Western recruits25 does represent something qualitatively new amongst 
Islamist movements. The real turning-point, and one that marked a re-politicization of 
 
 
25  On the power of attraction exerted by Salafism in Germany, see Biene/Daphi/Fielitz/Müller/Weipert-
Fenner (2015). 
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Islamic traditions, was the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. For the first time ever, a class of 
conservative Islamic scholars assumed power, equipped the state with an Islamic-inspired 
constitution, and imposed Islamic law and a set of conservative Islamic rules of behaviour 
on the population – and this had huge repercussions far beyond the borders of Iran.26 One 
particular activity in which the new Iranian leadership engaged was to rail against the 
godless, morally depraved West, to which, it claimed, Islam, with its high moral and 
religious standards, was far superior. In the Western world, the sentiments mostly evoked 
by the Iranian Revolution were those of alienation, fear, and rejection – not just in regard to 
the Shiite regime in Teheran but towards Islam in general, which was often portrayed 
indiscriminately as monolithic, backward, resistant to development, and inclined to 
violence. In neighbouring Arab countries too the Islamic Republic was mostly regarded 
with suspicion. 
It was in this climate of mistrust and dubiousness between Western liberal and Muslim 
societies that the ‘Rushdie affair’ occurred, in the 1980s, and with it came the first 
transnational wave of protests and demonstrations by Muslims in response to allegations of 
blasphemy. The protests against Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses culminated in the 
issuing of a fatwa by the Iranian revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini – at that time 
probably the most high-profile Muslim political figure on the world stage. In Britain in 
particular, the uproar surrounding the book and the issuing of the fatwa brought about a 
change in relations between Muslims and majority British society. Whereas previously the 
tensions between the ‘immigrant’ and ‘mainstream’ sections of the population had been 
discussed chiefly under the rubric of ethnic affiliation, religious identity now shifted into the 
foreground. Media accounts of the Rushdie affair not infrequently depicted Muslims as 
dangerous, irrational fanatics and there was a marked growth in hostility and violence 
towards them as a group. Muslims felt themselves increasingly discriminated against on 
account of their religious affiliation. At the start of the 1990s, the outbreak of the Second 
Gulf War reinforced these tendencies, with many Muslims across Europe demonstrating 
against the Western invasion of Iraq. It was during this time that the term ‘Islamophobia’ – 
denoting fear or hatred of Islam and Muslims – established itself, first in Britain and then 
internationally, and that the phenomenon itself began to be explored as a serious problem 
affecting Western societies, on a par with anti-Semitism (Bahçecik 2013; cf. Dobras 2008: 
351). The increased tensions between Western states and Muslim-influenced countries 
eventually led the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington to refer epi-
grammatically to a ‘clash of civilizations’, which he saw as being played out amongst all the 
major cultural groupings but above all between Islam and the West (Huntington 1993).27 
 
 
26  This was also reflected in the sharp increase in scholarly literature on the theme ‘Islam and politics’. See 
e.g. Sivan (1985); Ali (1986); Piscatori (1983); Zakaria (1989). 
27  Huntington’s simplistic analysis has been (quite rightly) criticized by many writers. For a representative 
sample from the German debate, see Müller (1998) and Senghaas (1998). 
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During the 1990s, various actors attempted to counter this strained situation through 
political negotiation, intergovernmental cooperation, social initiatives, and dialogue. After 
the Second Gulf War, the United States initiated a multilateral Middle East peace 
conference in Madrid. Stemming from this, secret talks were held between the PLO and 
Israel which ultimately led to the Oslo peace process. Israel’s Foreign Minister, Shimon 
Peres, was soon talking enthusiastically of a ‘new Middle East’ in which peace and economic 
prosperity would prevail (Peres 1993). In Iran, 1997 saw the election to the presidency of the 
moderate politician Mohammed Khatami, who was regarded as a reformer and was 
promising a change of course in both external and internal affairs. Khatami laid greater 
stress on détente and dialogue and made use of the OIC as one of the forums through which 
to promote this policy. As a counter to the ‘clash of civilizations’, Khatami proposed a 
‘dialogue of civilizations’, an initiative that eventually resulted in a corresponding UN 
General Assembly resolution and eventually also, in 2001, to the declaration of a ‘UN Year 
of Dialogue among Civilizations’, backed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Wastnidge 
2011). The UN gradually opened itself up to involvement and input by Muslim states and 
organizations. 
However, the ‘dialogue of civilizations’ initiative was not the only project that the OIC 
sought to realize within the framework of the UN. At more or less the same time as the 
‘dialogue’ initiative was underway, the OIC began to make use of the UN’s forums to raise 
the international profile of what it saw as the growing problem of Islamophobia and to try 
to secure a ban on blasphemy, discrimination, and defamation in respect of Islam. It 
brought before the UN Commission on Human Rights a resolution condemning ‘the 
defamation of Islam’ and calling on all states to combat such behaviour. In this way, it gave 
expression to its dissent from the dominant Western liberal order but did so by playing 
according to the rules of the established political institutions, not by initiating radical 
resistance and protest outside this order (Bettiza/Dionigi 2014). 
3.2  The Human-Rights Context of the OIC’s UN Initiative 
International human rights do not protect religions as such; rather, they uphold the right of 
individuals or groups freely to choose their religion or belief and to practise it. The most 
important document in which this right is set out is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Article 18 of the Declaration states that: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.’28 Freedom of religion 
and belief are key provisions of the Declaration of Human Rights and are also a core 
 
 
28  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A/RES/217 A (III). 
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element of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.29 According to 
these provisions, an individual is not subject to any legitimate restriction in ‘the inner 
sphere of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief [and this] freedom thus enjoys 
absolute sanctuary in its “forum internum”’ (Bielefeldt 2012: 15). But external 
manifestations of religion or belief – ‘which encompass both individual and community 
practices and may take place either in public or in private’ (Bielefeldt 2012: 15) – are also 
protected within the ‘forum internum’, though not to the extent of being entirely free of the 
possibility of restriction. In addition, the right to freedom of religion and belief also 
encompasses individuals who decide not to belong to any religion or to believe in anything: 
both positive and negative freedom of religion are valid – and only the combination of the 
two ‘[give] this human right its libertarian character’ (Bielefeldt 2012: 16). 
By contrast, there is no right in international human-rights law to have one’s religion or 
belief excluded, across the board, from the possibility of criticism, denigration, or insult 
(Temperman 2008: 525). Respect for religious feelings and protection against defamation 
are not enshrined in the relevant human-rights documents. Although Articles 19 and 20 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contain provisions limiting the 
right to freedom of expression, these only take effect in exceptional cases. The level at which 
expression of an opinion is defined as unacceptable, and therefore as warranting 
prosecution, is pitched extremely high – such an expression would have to constitute a 
threat to national security, for example, or infringe the rights of others. Article 20 makes 
explicit reference to religious hatred: ‘Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by 
law.’30 However, protection of religion is not in itself a legitimate ground for restricting the 
right to freedom of expression: ‘The ICCPR does not specifically target defamation of 
religion as an operative “carve-out” for protection’ (Foster 2009: 35). The right to freedom 
of opinion may only be restricted where there is incitement to religious hatred resulting in 
discrimination, hostility, or violence (Graham 2009: 19). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a non-binding document; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is binding on those states that have 
signed it. However, both the right to freedom of religion and belief and the right to freedom 
 
 
29  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR/C/3/Rev. 6, Art. 18: ‘1. Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No 
one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of 
his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for 
the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of 
their children in conformity with their own convictions.’ 
30  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, March 23, 1976, 
www.ohchr.org, http://bit.ly/Jz4HwZ (October 14, 2015). 
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of expression are deemed part of customary international law, which is binding on all states, 
even those that have not ratified the Covenant (Dobras 2008: 342; Cismas 2014: 45–48).31 
The provisions relating to freedom of religion and freedom of opinion are based on 
philosophical principles that are generally recognized as having guided the course of the 
international human-rights regime since the foundation of the United Nations. The historic 
task of creating a normative framework for a universal system of human-rights legislation 
inevitably came up against the problem of getting the various cultures and religions 
represented in the UN to agree which points of reference they could all work to (Foster 
2009: 19). Following extensive consultations, the idea of the dignity of the human person 
emerged as a viable basis for human rights. In the very first sentence of the UN’s founding 
document – the UN Charter – the participating states affirm their ‘faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’.32 All subsequent covenants, 
protocols, treaties, and declarations in which the concept of human rights is further 
developed echo this philosophical affirmation of the principle of personal human dignity. 
That the concept of human dignity was able, despite the cultural heterogeneity of the 
UN’s member-states, to bridge the differences between them was due not least to the fact 
that it was never precisely defined in any of the relevant UN documents (Donnelly 2013: 
28–29). As a result, everyone could identify with it. The UN ‘successfully drafted its 
formative documents based upon broad, largely undefined principles that member 
countries did not disagree with on a philosophical level at the very outset, given the open-
ended nature of the definition’ (Foster 2009: 38). The concept of dignity holds a special 
value that enjoins respect. Historically, it was closely tied to particular social positions or 
offices, but the shift to human dignity represents a democratization: ‘The claim of human 
dignity is that simply being human makes one worthy or deserving of respect; that there is 
an inherent worth that demands respect in all of us’ (Donnelly 2013: 29; Foster 2009: 21). A 
corollary of this philosophical rationale for human rights is that these rights only ever apply 
to the individual: only an individual human being, not a collectivity, can lay claim to them 
(Donnelly 2013: 30). 
3.3  A New Norm: The Protection of Religion against Defamation 
Both the rights involved here – the right to freedom of religion and belief and the right to 
freedom of expression – are thus based on the principle that it is the individual, as the 
repository of human dignity, that is afforded protection. The OIC’s arguments in favour of 
a ban on the defamation of religions diverge from this basic principle: in place of the 
 
 
31  The great majority of OIC member-countries have signed the Covenant. Amongst the exceptions are 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia, which have neither signed nor ratified it. 
32  UN General Assembly, Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 
www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml (October 14, 2015). 
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individual in need of protection we have an idea or conviction – specifically, religion 
(Graham 2009: 78). The earliest draft of the anti-defamation resolution, introduced for the 
first time into the Commission on Human Rights by Pakistan in 1999, on behalf of the OIC, 
still went by the title ‘Defamation of Islam’. Supporters of the resolution argued that the 
Islamophobia now rife in the West necessitated measures to protect Islam from hostile 
treatment and insult. On behalf of the European Union (EU), Germany called for attention 
to be directed not just at Islam but at other religions as well (Blitt 2011: 353). After tough 
negotiations, the resolution – eventually adopted without a vote by the Commission – 
emerged bearing the title ‘Defamation of Religions’, but its focus remained very clearly on 
Islam. It expressed great concern at the ‘negative stereotyping of religions’ and underlined 
the way in which Islam was ‘frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations 
and terrorism’. It was worrying, it said, that the media were ‘[being] used to incite acts of 
violence, xenophobia or related intolerance and discrimination towards Islam and any other 
religion’. It therefore called on states ‘within their national legal framework, in conformity 
with international human rights instruments to take all appropriate measures to combat 
hatred, discrimination, intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and coercion 
motivated by religious intolerance’.33 
Clause 3, with its mention of ‘acts of violence, xenophobia or related intolerance and 
discrimination towards Islam and other religions’, uses ideas and phraseology familiar from, 
for example, Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
calls on states to outlaw ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’.34 The difference is that the defamation 
resolution spotlights discrimination and violence towards Islam and other religions – in 
other words towards a creed or idea – rather than towards individual people or groups of 
people. 
3.4  The Failure of the OIC Initiative 
The change of title to ‘Defamation of Religions’ deflected the criticisms initially expressed 
not only by Western states but also by India and Japan. The resolution, in its various 
subsequent permutations, appeared to be a success for the OIC – despite being non-
binding, like all resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights. In 1999 and 2000 it was 
adopted by the Commission without a vote, but this event received scant attention 
internationally, probably because the Commission’s reputation was already suspect. A 
subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly, the Commission set very low standards for 
membership, with the result that even states who were themselves accused of gross human-
 
 
33  Full text at E/1999/23E/CN.4/1999/167. 
34  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, March 23, 1976, Art. 20, 
www.ohchr.org (September 29, 2015), http://bit.ly/Jz4HwZ (Septemper 29, 2015). 
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rights violations were admitted as members: ‘Because of these lax standards, the UNCHR 
became discredited by the United Nations’ (Dobras 2008: 353). In 2006, in response to 
ongoing criticism, the General Assembly dissolved the Commission and established the 
Human Rights Council in its stead.35 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, carried out by Al-Quaeda-
sponsored terrorists, rekindled the dissension between Muslim and Western countries. The 
US administration, led by George W. Bush, declared the ‘War on Terror’, which was then 
prosecuted over a period of years using political, intelligence-based, and military means. 
Muslims frequently fell under blanket suspicion and many Western societies saw a growth 
in anti-Muslim tendencies. In the eyes of many, Huntington appeared to have been right in 
his prediction of a clash of civilizations, notably between Muslim societies and the West. 
The attacks in New York and Washington, and the increase in violence and discrimination 
against Muslims in many Western countries, were reflected in subsequent draft resolutions. 
These now made direct reference to the events of 11 September, to the latter’s negative 
repercussions on Muslim minorities, the negative media-depiction of Islam and its values 
and traditions, and the introduction of laws that discriminated against Muslims 
(Rehman/Berry 2012: 436–437). Inside the UN human-rights system itself a number of 
high-profile advocates of the ‘defamation of religions’ idea emerged post 9/11. One such 
was the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Doudou Diène. In his reports, Diène 
categorized Islamophobia alongside ‘Christianophobia’ and anti-Semitism as different 
forms of defamation of religion on a par with racism and xenophobia (Rehman/Berry 2012: 
440; Kayaoglu 2014: 84–85). It was amidst all this tension, in 2001, that the Commission on 
Human Rights first subjected the anti-defamation resolution to a vote: 29 states voted for 
adoption, 15 against, and 9 abstained. 
To start with, therefore, in the shadow of 11 September, there was clear support for the 
anti-defamation resolution. But this trend was not to last long:36 because there was much 
greater interest in the OIC resolutions following the terror-attacks, they were subjected to 
much closer scrutiny and analysed from a human-rights perspective. The USA in particular, 
flanked by European countries and other Western states, criticized both the focus on Islam 
and the incompatibility with other human rights such as the right to free expression, and 
put a question-mark over the whole idea of using anti-defamation legislation to deal with 
conflicts involving religion. These criticisms were echoed by a range of non-governmental 
organizations, both religious and secular, who likewise underlined the incompatibility of the 
anti-defamation resolutions with other human rights and expressed concern that the 
blasphemy-laws in force in Muslim countries might be exported elsewhere. The OIC 
 
 
35  Which, however, continues to attract the kind of criticism levelled at the Commission. See Besant/Malo 
(2009). 
36  For an overview of the voting results in the various UN forums in the period from 1999 to 2010, see 
Kayaoglu (2015: 76–77). 
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responded to these charges by rewording the text of the resolution more inclusively, getting 
non-Muslim states on board to boost the supporters’ camp, and stressing that its main 
concern was to protect Muslim minorities, not to protect religion per se (Kayaoglu 2015: 
80–84). 
Despite the OIC’s efforts, however, by 2001, and perhaps even before this, it began to be 
clear that the anti-defamation resolution was destined for failure. Support waned, critical 
voices grew ever louder, and the OIC found itself increasingly in the position of having to 
strike compromises. The potential for involvement by Muslim states, and the prospect that 
a new norm would be successfully established, gradually diminished in the face of the 
negative attitude of the Western states and NGOs. Although it took until 2011 for the 
resolution to be completely removed from the agenda, the balance of power started to shift 
in favour of the Western liberal critics as early as the mid-2000s. 
Why the OIC failed in its attempt to get a new norm established in human-rights 
legislation is a question that has so far received little treatment in the literature. Exceptions 
are the studies by Bettiza/Dionigi (2014) and Kayaoglu (2014). Bettiza/Dionigi’s account 
draws on Habermasian post-secular theory. Whereas, they say, norm-research in 
International Relations has so far concentrated chiefly on the diffusion of Western liberal 
norms to the non-Western periphery, they themselves present the OIC initiative on the 
anti-defamation resolutions as an example of an attempt by a non-Western, religious actor 
to get a new norm established within the liberal international order. But for this attempt to 
succeed, they say, there has to be a process of institutional translation of the norm37 that cuts 
across differing cultural and institutional contexts. Bettiza/Dionigi pick up on Habermas’s 
notion of a translational proviso – in other words, the condition that religious content has 
to be translated into generally comprehensible, secular language before it can be included in 
formal decision-making processes in parliaments, governments, and judicial systems. They 
use this Habermasian condition as an analytical instrument which they can apply generally 
to assess translational processes in post-secular world society as processes of norm-
contestation between actors of differing religious and cultural provenance. In the case of the 
OIC’s UN initiative, the authors come to the conclusion that the process of translating the 
particularist Islamic norm outlawing blasphemy and the denigration of Islam into a norm 
comprehensible in secular terms was unsuccessful – and this despite the fact that in the 
years of tension following 9/11 it would undoubtedly have been in the West’s interests to try 
to improve relations between the Western and the Muslim worlds. The specificity of the 
OIC norm enshrined in the resolutions, and the lack of the kind of interpretive leeway that 
would have allowed Western secular states also to lend their support, scuppered the process 
of translation, say the authors. 
 
 
37  ‘Translation’ here denotes the migration of ideas and their linkage into a different context, where they 
develop a new dynamic (Kaufmann/Rottenburg 2012). 
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Kayaoglu’s analysis (2014) also picks up on the translational process. He describes the 
UN as a secular organization in which liberal, Western states and civil-society organizations 
dominate the discourse on norms and rights: ‘Secular gatekeepers and liberal values 
dominate and have forced faith-based voices to shed their partisan religious sentiments and 
non-liberal arguments and translate their discourse into liberal values of diversity, 
individualism, science, and human rights’ (Kayaoglu 2014: 70). Accordingly, says Kayaoglu, 
the OIC increasingly clothed its anti-defamation campaign in the terminology of the 
secular, liberal human-rights discourse. Initially, this secured attention for the initiative, but 
by adopting this approach, the OIC had ventured onto terrain in which secular, liberal 
actors hold sway on matters of interpretation, with the result that these actors retained the 
upper hand in the debate. Moreover, the OIC’s main concern, according to Kayaoglu, was 
to stem the tide of Islamophobia that was threatening Muslim minorities in Western 
countries, but its concessions to the liberal discourse ultimately led to the tables being 
turned against it, with Western liberal actors in their turn accusing it of wanting to export 
blasphemy-legislation that was contrary to human rights, as practised in a number of its 
member-states. 
3.5  From Opposition to Dissidence: The Cartoon Controversy 
In January and February 2006, there was an undreamt-of escalation in the confrontation 
between freedom of expression and the concern to protect religion from defamation. 
Transnational protest, some of it violent, saw thousands of Muslims simultaneously take to 
the streets across the Muslim world. What triggered the protest was a series of twelve 
cartoons that had been published on 30 September 2005 in the Danish daily newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten. The cartoons depicted the Prophet Mohammed – in one case with a bomb 
in his turban, in another angrily wielding a scimitar, in another as keeper of the heavenly 
virgins reserved to the martyrs of the Jihad. Arson attacks were carried out on the Danish 
embassies in Syria and Lebanon; governments called for a boycott on Danish goods; and 
‘Denmark found itself in the biggest foreign policy crisis since the German occupation 
during the Second World War as the crisis rapidly exploded in a conflict of international 
dimensions’ (Bonde 2007: 33). 
In Denmark, the ‘cartoon controversy’ occurred at a time when the Muslim minority in 
this small European country was the butt of hostile rhetoric from right-wing and 
conservative politicians (Bonde 2007: 36). Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Liberal 
Party was governing in coalition with the Conservative People’s Party and had the tacit 
sanction of the populist right-wing Danish People’s Party. When the editors of Jyllands-
Posten commented, in a companion-piece to the cartoons, that some Muslims rejected 
modern, secular society and that by insisting on respect for their religious feelings they were 
effectively demanding a special status, they were echoing the general mood. Such a demand, 
said Jyllands-Posten, was not compatible with secular democracy and the free expression of 
opinion, which required you, rather, to be prepared to put up with ‘disdain, mockery, and 
ridicule’ (Bonde 2007: 35). 
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The difficulties experienced by Denmark’s Muslim minority do not, however, explain 
the transnational eruption of protest and violence that occurred at the start of 2006. In the 
first few weeks after the cartoons had been published, the demonstrations and protest-
actions were indeed largely confined to Denmark. The Islamic Society, a Muslim umbrella-
organization in Denmark, led the protest and filed charges of blasphemy and 
discrimination. In addition, in mid-October, eleven ambassadors from various Muslim 
countries wrote to Prime Minister Rasmussen complaining about the situation of the 
Muslim minority in Denmark and condemning the ‘smear campaign’ against Islam and 
Muslims in politics and the media. They called on the prime minister to work to promote 
dialogue and understanding and requested a meeting with him. But in his reply Rasmussen 
pointed to the right of free speech that existed in Denmark and declined the request for a 
meeting. This unreceptive attitude on the part of Rasmussen, being interpreted as an insult 
not only by the ambassadors but also by many Muslims in Denmark, contributed in no 
small measure to the further escalation of the conflict. Not until much later did Rasmussen 
attempt to de-escalate the conflict via interviews with Arab broadcasters and in various 
speeches. 
The extent to which the conflict then spread transnationally was not down to Danish 
events alone, however. Drawing on theories of New Social Movements and conflict 
dynamics, Olesen (2007) has analysed the shift from the national to the transnational level. 
One of the prior conditions which Olesen identifies for the cartoon controversy was the 
changed political context after the events of 11 September 2001: political elites both across 
the Muslim and Arab world and in Europe and the USA now had much more incentive to 
tie their political messages to religious motives. In addition, with the advent of broadcasting 
channels such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, a highly professionalized media landscape had 
emerged in which it was possible to reach vast swathes of the population in the Arab and 
Muslim world (Olesen 2007: 38). 
Without these two preconditions, the cartoon controversy would probably not have 
spread with such virulence beyond the Danish borders. Another factor necessary for the 
spread, however, was the action of a number of players who – for differing reasons and not 
always deliberately – drove the escalation forward. In December and January of 2005/6, a 
delegation from the Muslim communities in Denmark undertook a tour of Egypt, Lebanon, 
and Turkey. In their suitcases they had copies of the cartoons and an account they had 
drawn up of the situation of Muslims in Denmark. This dossier focused on the religious 
aspect of the cartoon episode, in other words the blasphemy committed against the Prophet. 
The delegates addressed the accompanying letter to anyone ‘who wants to support our fight 
to defend and support the holy prophet and with all legal means fight for the passing of a 
general law, which ensures respect for all things sacred, particularly the Muslim, in a time 
which allows attacks on Muslim sanctuaries using “war against terror” as an excuse’ (quoted 
in Bonde 2007: 44). 
The Danish delegation’s message fell on fertile ground, both in the countries they visited 
and further afield: ‘The cartoon case was a window of opportunity for the Muslim 
governments to defend religion upfront without allowing room to the growing religious 
opposition within their communities’ (Bonde 2007: 44). Of key significance in the further 
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escalation were Egypt and the OIC: ‘The data indicate that the main force behind the 
escalation was the brokerage of institutional actors. Two of these are of critical importance: 
Egypt and the OIC’ (Olesen 2007: 47). As early as October 2005, Egypt involved itself in the 
attempt by the eleven ambassadors to secure a meeting with the Danish prime minister. The 
Egyptian government made deliberate use of the OIC to get the issue into the public eye. 
The OIC, in its turn, showed itself more than willing to stoke the cartoon controversy, 
dispatching protest-letters to the Danish government, urging the UN to outlaw attacks on 
religion, and, in January 2006, calling for a Danish-financed festival of Islamic culture to be 
boycotted. This prompted prominent European and American politicians and heads of 
government – including former US president Bill Clinton – to make their first critical 
comments about the publication of the cartoons. 
Thus, the transnational escalation of the protest was preceded by a period of months 
during which Egypt and the OIC, as governmental and intergovernmental entities 
respectively, had prepared the ground for large-scale resistance to Western societies’ 
defamation and disparagement of Islam in the name of freedom of expression (Olsen 2007: 
48). Inside the UN, the chances of the ‘Defamation of Religions’ initiative succeeding grew 
steadily smaller. Faced with this situation, the OIC adopted the alternative strategy of 
initiating protests in its member-states. The closing-off of opportunities for involvement by 
the OIC was thus a contributing factor in causing the cartoon controversy to escalate to the 
extent described here. 
Another contributing factor, however, was the large-scale exposure given to the issue by 
Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. According to Olesen : ‘The conflict started gathering force in the 
last five days of January and . . . this development largely coincided with growing attention 
to the conflict by Al-Jazeera’ (Olesen 2007: 48). Shortly after this, demonstrations took place 
in Palestine, Yemen, Indonesia, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iran, Egypt, and the 
Philippines. In Lebanon and Syria there were arson attacks on the Danish embassy. 
4.  Is an International Solution Possible? 
In 2011, after twelve years of bitter wrangling over the ‘Defamation of Religions’ 
resolutions, the OIC, in conjunction with the United States and the European Union, put 
forward a new draft resolution. Resolution 16/18, entitled ‘Combating Intolerance, Negative 
Stereotyping and Stigmatisation of, and Discrimination, Incitement to Violence, and 
Violence against Persons Based on Religions or Belief’, was adopted for the first time by the 
Human Rights Council in 2011, by consensus. It aims, not to protect religions per se, but to 
safeguard individuals against discrimination and violence on the grounds of their religion 
or belief and to do so without curtailing the right to free speech. 
Did this mean that, following the expressions of opposition and dissidence, there was 
now to be some kind of concord that would resolve the normative conflict between the right 
to freedom of expression and the protection of religions from denigration and blasphemy – 
and thus also stem the recurrent tide of violence for the long term? 
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Initial reactions were uniformly positive: critics of the defamation motions lauded the 
new resolution as ‘an important breakthrough for human rights and the promotion of 
religious tolerance’ (Aswad et al. 2014: 141; Kayaoglu/Petersen 2013); the OIC too presented 
the resolution as a success and as proof of positive cooperation with the United States and 
Europe. The aspect that came in for the most praise was the inclusion, as one of the 
cornerstones of the resolution, of an action-plan designed to help deal on a long-term basis 
with intolerance, discrimination, and violence based on religion or belief – for example, 
through education, through specialist training for government officials, and through inter-
faith dialogue. Curtailment of the right to freedom of expression by criminal sanction was 
specified by the resolution as being permissible only where the opinion expressed 
constituted an incitement to imminent violence. 
In the sphere of politics too, considerable importance was attached to the new 
resolution. This is clear from the invitation issued jointly by the General Secretary of the 
OIC, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, and the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in July 2011, 
proposing an initial meeting in Istanbul to work out a coordinated approach to 
implementing the action-plan. Participants to this meeting included the EU’s High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, plus foreign 
ministers and other representatives from a total of twenty countries. In December of the 
same year, the United States convened the first implementation-meeting of what was 
dubbed the ‘Istanbul Process’ in Washington. Further meetings took place in London (2012, 
convened jointly by Britain and Canada), Geneva (2013, convened by the OIC), Doha 
(2014, convened by Qatar), and Saudi Arabia (2015, convened by the OIC). Chile has 
announced that it will be hosting a further Istanbul Process meeting in 2015. In autumn 
2012, in a complementary move, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) unveiled the ‘Rabat Plan of Action’,38 the product of a process of intensive 
worldwide consultation with experts in the field. The plan specifies the duties which Article 
20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights imposes on states in regard to 
the protection of individuals against ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’. With this instrument, which 
lays down very strict criteria for the criminal sanction of hate speech and at the same time 
proposes mechanisms for dialogue, the OHCHR seeks to get past the debate on the 
‘defamation of religions’. The plan openly opposes national blasphemy-legislation. 
Despite all this, as Elizabeth Cassidy, Deputy Director for Policy and Research at the 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, points out (Cassidy 2013), 
consensus on Resolution 16/18 remains fragile. By the third meeting of the Istanbul Process 
– for which the OIC was the chief organizer – representatives of the OIC and the Western 
states were already dividing along familiar lines. Thus, whilst OIC member-states 
 
 
38  UN OHCHR, Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or Religious 
Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence, October 5, 2012, 
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considered the criminalization of hate speech, intolerance, and discrimination relating to 
religion to be the most important tool for getting the resolution enforced, Western states 
argued for ‘soft measures’ such as education and cultural exchange, because, they said, the 
use of legal means often proved counterproductive. There was also disagreement as to what 
should constitute hate speech and incitement to violence: whilst Western states interpreted 
these concepts narrowly, OIC countries considered that even public support for hate speech 
– and not just direct incitement to actual violence – should be made a criminal offence. 
Finally, states were also at odds with one another as to which groups at the present time 
were primarily affected by religious intolerance and thus fell within the resolution’s 
purview. In the opinion of Pakistan, Algeria, and other OIC countries, Muslims in Western 
countries were the chief victims of discrimination. The United States and the EU 
acknowledged that these kinds of anti-Muslim trends did indeed exist in Western societies, 
but at the same time called for the situation of threatened religious minorities in the OIC 
states also to be improved (Kayaoglu/Petersen 2013). 
Whether it will be possible, in the long term, for the Istanbul Process to bring about a 
political compromise that embraces OIC opposition in the UN and also channels the 
dissidence of countless Muslims across the world in a cooperative direction remains to be 
seen. Given the latest change of leadership within the OIC and the adoption of a distinctly 
more conservative orientation as compared with the period from 2005 to 2013, it seems 
increasingly likely that the OIC will keep up its anti-defamation rhetoric – and that many of 
its member-states will cleave to their repressive blasphemy-laws. 
Even before the June meeting in Saudi Arabia, the non-governmental organization 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) was warning that the OIC might renew 
its attempts to push through a global blasphemy-law. In particular, FIDH voiced its concern 
that the OIC representatives would try to reopen the discussion as to where prohibited hate 
speech ends and permitted free speech begins. The relevant UN agreements, said FIDH, and 
documents such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Resolution 
16/18, and the Rabat Plan of Action, provided sufficient guidance as to where this 
distinction lay: ‘Attempting to go beyond what has been agreed and to criminalize acts that 
do not fall under the scope of article 20(2) of the ICCPR would be tantamount to 
attempting to criminalize freedom of expression with regard to religious issues’ (FIDH 
2015). An attempt of this kind to restrict the right to freedom of expression, said FIDH, 
would essentially mark a return to the ‘defamation of religions’ idea. A report by the NGO 
Universal Rights similarly concludes, in light of the resurgent conflicts, that the OIC’s 
decision not to pursue its ‘defamation of religions’ idea merely indicates its acceptance of 
the fact that its selected strategy has not worked; its commitment to its substantive goals, 
however, remains unchanged (Limon/Ghanea/Power 2014). 
As one of the principal players in the Istanbul Process, the EU should use every available 
opportunity to fight these latest attempts to reintroduce an anti-defamation agenda into the 
debate ‘through the back door’. To do this, the successes that have already been achieved – 
in other words, Resolution 16/18 and the Rabat Plan of Action – need to be firmly 
established as a valid framework, adopted, not least, with the concurrence of the OIC. This 
approach could succeed if, in future, attention were focused more on the implementation of 
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the very concrete plan of action detailed in Resolution 16/18 (Limon/Ghanea/Power 2014). 
At the moment, this kind of focus is lacking. In 2014, only twenty-four states – one of them 
being Germany – presented reports on the implementation of the resolution. Future 
Istanbul meetings should be used to move beyond theoretical debates and promote the 
implementation of the resolution in all its aspects. To achieve this, greater use could be 
made of established UN mechanisms and instruments such as the Universal Periodic 
Review. 
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